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Abstract
Forecasts are an essential ingredient of the
planning process. Although frequently of necessity
inaccurate, they can nevertheless be of considerable
utility; for they should not be judged by the degree
of uncertainty they convey but by the degree to
which they permit differentiation between genuine
and avoidable uncertainty.
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The Utility of Long-Term Forecasting
Futures research as an identifiable intellectual activity
received much of its early impetus from the long-range fore-
casting studies conducted under Rand and TRW auspices in the
middle Sixties and their subsequent emulations by numerous
other organizations. Recently a slight disenchantment with
long-range forecasting seems to have set in in some circles,
caused largely--I think--by the realization of how inaccurate
predictions have been concerning the future more than a few
years hence, either because of altogether wrong prophecies
(especially in economics) or because of a failure to foresee
important developments (e.g., the OPEC oil embargo, which
triggered a sudden awareness of the energy crisis among the
oil-importing countries). This disenchantment may be based on
some misconceptions, having to do largely with the role of
uncertainty. While the task of the forecaster surely includes
the removal of as much uncertainty about the future as can
legitimately be accomplished, it equally should not neglect
to bring genuine uncertainty, due to deficiencies in currently
available information, to the attention of planners. Futures
research, and long-range forecasting in particular, should not
be judged by the degree of uncertainty it conveys but by the
degree to which it is capable of differentiating between
unnecessary and unavoidable uncertainty.
Futures research may be defined as that part of operations
research which is concerned with the support of planning
activities that relate to a future sufficiently far distant
so that the operating environment at the time the plans are
implemented differs substantially from the operating environ-
ment at the time the plans are being made. An essential aspect
of futures research, therefore, is the forecasting (not the
prediction!) of such changes in operating conditions. (In the
terminology generally accepted by now, "forecasts" as distinct
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from "predictions" are stated in probabilistic terms.)
For example, someone preparing to publish a new newspaper
may safely rely on a survey of present preferences among the
newspaper-reading public in order to decide what emphasis to
give to various features. The operating environment is not
likely to change very fast, and no futures research is required.
On the other hand, someone growing trees for profit and having
to decide between lumber, woodpulp, and other uses of his pro-
duct decades hence, must be concerned over the continuing
demand for wooden houses and newsprint at that time. Here,
futures research may be of help, both by deriving relevant
probabilistic forecasts and by establishing planning procedures
that properly account for the expected changes and the uncer-
tainties implied by such forecasts. In addition to providing
nonconditional forecasts of exogenous developments which will
constitute the setting against which plans for the long-term
future have to be made, it is equally important, if not more so,
for futures research to furnish conditional forecasts, that is,
estimates of the probable implications of various alternative
policies and of alternative action programs for implementing a
given policy, and to do so in consideration of the previously
established forecasts of external operating conditions. Such
conditional forecasts are clearly needed when the planner
operates in what is called the "exploratory" mode, that is,
when a selective decision among competing policies or action
programs has to be made; for it is by their implications that
they will be judged. Conditional forecasts also playa role,
though a somewhat different one, in the case of the so-called
"normative" planning mode. Here the planner operates in reverse:
he starts with what he considers a preferred end condition and
then (if indeed he acts as a planner and not just a utopian
dreamer) searches for ways and means of implementing the "policy"
of attaining the wished-for state. In this case, a conditional
forecasting analysis will serve to ascertain which implementation
plan may be expected to come closest to achieving the desired
end.
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Thus, from a planner's point of view, the desirability of
having both absolute and conditional long-term forecasts seems
to be quite evident and, if none are supplied, it is inevitable
that, in fact, the planner merely relies on his own, perhaps
not even articulated, forecasts. We note in passing that even
forecasts based merely on purely intuitive insight rather than
on established theory are of some value here, provided there is
reason to have some trust in their reliability. If a forecast
does happen to be theory-based, in the sense of being an
instance of a general law that derives explanatory force from
being part of a coherent theory of the phenomena in question,
this will be of additional utility to the planner; for it will
not only enable him to choose the best among given alternative
strategies but, because of its explanatory character, it will
help him in designing strategies in the first place that are
apt to influence the future in a desired direction. Since
forecasts frequently fail to be explanatory in this sense, the
burden of constructing candidate strategies tends to fall upon
the inventive imagination of the planner--a creative aspect of
planning which is often given inadequate attention.
In view of the planner's need for forecasts and their added
utility to him when they incorporate explanations, the questions
that remain are whether it is possible to obtain forecasts of
sufficient reliability and precision to improve the planning
process over what it would be if the planner were left to rely
solely on his own intuitive expectations, and whether, in
addition, such forecasts can be made within the framework of an
explanatory theory.
With regard to the first question, a number of comments are
appropriate. First of all, it is important to keep in mind
that perfection in planning, while a laudable ideal, is not a
necessary criterion of the utility of forecasts to the planning
process. Even if, statistically speaking, the systematic
utilization of forecasts produces only a slight improvement in
the expected results of planning, such forecasts may well be
worth while. Secondly, experience has shown that long-range
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forecasts obtained from professional experts can in fact be
quite accurate. A survey conducted at the Institute for the
*Future a few years ago, in which Delphi-generated forecasts
made years earlier were examined, found that of all events
which had been given a probability, say, of 60% of occurring
by the time that survey was made about 60% had in fact occurred
by then. Thirdly, it may be objected by some that, even if we
could be sure that of all events forecasted with a probability
of 60% to occur by a certain date exactly 60% did occur by
that date, the uncertainty implied by this information would
be so great as to render the forecast useless to the planner.
In response to this objection it must be pointed out that it
would be a delusion to think that planning does not proceed in
an atmosphere of uncertainty. A probabilistic forecast, as
opposed to a precise prediction, imposes a realistic awareness
of the uncertainty of the future. This compels the planner to
incorporate provisions for contingencies in his plans without
which he might be courting disaster. Fourthly, and finally,
it has been said quite correctly that it is the mark of a good
executive to display sufficient acumen in discerning likely
future contingencies to be able to make the right decisions
without having to resort to outside advice in the form of
forecasts. However, this phenomenon does not constitute
testimony of the existence of some form of divination but more
likely points to the presence of a relatively superior intelli-
gence that enables the executive to judge the reliability of
all sorts of signals he receives from the environment and
thereby to form, implicitly or explicitly, his own set of
forecasts. He is, in other words, himself the kind of profes-
sional expert whose forecasting talents one might wish to
utilize beyond his own decision-making sphere.
Let us now consider the second question raised earlier,
which concerns the feasibility of making forecasts that are
supported by the explanatory framework of a coherent theory.
*Robert Ament, "Comparison of Delphi Forecasting Studies
in 1964 and 1969"; Futures, vol. 2 (1970).
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The ideal case here is represented by astronomical forecasts
(which virtually amount to predictions), such as that of the
next reappearance of Halley's cornet. What makes this such a
high-probability forecast is its being based on well understood
and well confirmed physical laws, plus the fact that deliberate
intervention in the occurrence of this event is not a practical
possibility. Most of our planning, of course, takes place in
a sphere where a comparable degree of certainty is not present,
and the kind of long-range forecasts on which we would like to
rely inevitably involve some aspect of human affairs, either in
the sense that the subject matter itself is societal in nature
or that the probability of occurrence of whatever event is
being forecasted is affected by the degree of human intervention.
Typical examples are economic and technological forecasts. The
occurrence, say, of another worldwide economic depression
clearly concerns, and is affected by, human events. And even
a purely technical forecast, say, of a breakthrough in solar-
to-electric energy conversion obviously is influenced by the
amount of research and development effort devoted to it. In
cases of these kinds, the theoretical structures on which the
forecasts are based are neither well understood nor well con-
firmed, which is typical of a context that is a multidisciplinary
and at least partly a social-science one. Intuitive insight
therefore plays as large a part as, if not a larger part than,
reasoned arguments in obtaining such forecasts. Thus the answer
to the question under discussion cannot be wholly in the affir-
mative: not all forecasts of interest in typical planning
situations may be expected to occur within the explanatory
framework of a coherent theory. Yet, while the reasons for a
long-range forecast containing societal elements are apt to be
largely intuitive, there are generally some law-like regu-
larities, having a limited but nonnegligible degree of con-
firmation, which at least lend some support to purely intuitive
insight. Thus there tends to be an explanatory element present
that may carry enough weight to permit the planner to identify
measures which have more than a random chance of influencing
events in the desired direction. For example, a government
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planner, wishing to bring about a reduction in the consumption
of motor fuel, may propose a doubling of the gasoline tax, in
the expectation that the demand will not be so inelastic as
to be totally unresponsive to the resultant price rise. The
implied forecast here is based on a IIlaw ll of economics which,
though known to have exceptions, provides a certain amount of
guidance for economic behavior. Moreover, reliance on past
time series, in this case, will furnish some clues as to how
much of a reduction in gasoline demand might be expected as a
result of the proposed tax increase.
While in the field of economics such mildly confirmed
regularities abound, often even in quantified form, the same
is rarely the case in other social-science areas and even less
so in multidisciplinary situations. It is here that the so-called
cross-impact approach offers, if not a complete remedy, then at
least a better-than-nothing substitute for law-like regularities.
The cross-impact concept was invented, in the first place, in
order to enrich the results of sets of intuitive forecasts (such
as a series of technological forecasts that might be obtained
through a Delphi survey of expert opinions). Instead of merely
requiring estimates of the probabilities of occurrence of
potential future events, considered in isolation from one
another, a cross-impact analysis inquires, in addition, into
the effects that the occurrence of anyone of the events included
in the survey would have on the probability of occurrence of the
remaining events. Intuitive numerical estimates of these effects,
called cross impacts, are recorded in a square matrix, (x .. ),
1J
where x .. is a measure of the impact which the occurrence of the1J
i-th event, E., has on the probability of occurrence of the j-th
1
event, E .. Thus, the cross-impact matrix represents a set of
J
estimates of the causal relationships among the events under
consideration. The quantities x .. as a rule have to be obtained1J
through intuitive estimation by experts and do not in themselves
convey any information that would explain the reasons for the
causal relationships they indicate. However, if the x .. are
1J
generated through some kind of Delphi procedure, the respondents,
in justifying a nonzero assignment to a particular x ij ' may
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provide an intuitive argument for, and thus a possible explana-
tion of, the claimed causal relationship. Moreover, while the
x .. individually and aside from any incidental explicationJ.)
given by their estimators are not explanatory in nature, the
matrix (xij ) as a whole represents a coherent pattern of cau-
sality assertions and may be regarded as the next best thing
to a theory of the phenomena under consideration.
possible scenarios of the future, which a planner may be
considering, are formulated in terms not only of events (such
as technological breakthroughs, acts of legislation, earth-
quakes, elections, etc.) which take place at specific times,
but also of trends representing gradual developments (such as
population growth, GNP, degree of pollution, etc.). Cross-
impact analysis has been extended to include trends as well as
*events (essentially by interpreting as an "event ll a trend's
deviation from its anticipated value); the estimation of causal
connections (llcross impacts ll ) can thus be extended to all of
the elements that make up a scenario of the future.
The utility, to a planner, of a long-range forecasting
study augmented by a cross-impact analysis becomes very
apparent in a situation where the subject area in which plans
are to be made is essentially multidisciplinary, because con-
ventional extrapolative analyses, in such a case, almost cer-
tainly will fail to provide the kind of explanatory informa-
tion from which a sound strategy can be constructed. A good
example is a recently conducted study in the area of long-range
. . **transportatJ.on plannJ.ng. Here the planning agency was con-
fronted with the need to forecast not only developments in
transportation technology but also in its future operating
environment, i.e., in communication technology, demography,
economic conditions, land use policies, energy availability,
* .See my paper on "Problems J.n Futures Research--Delphi
and Causal Cross-Impact Analysis", Futures, February 1977.
**Paul Gray and Olaf Helmer, "The California Transportation
System ll , Report by the Center for Futures Research, University
of Southern California, November 1974.
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people's changing values, and so on. In a planning situation
of this kind, where there are no well confirmed regularities
covering the different areas of concern and, especially, their
interconnections, the planner can attempt to put together his
own surrogate theory, in the form of a cross-impact analysis,
and thus build a foundation upon which to design strategies
that have at least a slightly better chance of coping with
future contingencies than those arrived at without the benefit
of this kind of systematic underpinning.
The procedural steps he would have to follow in such an
undertaking might be described very briefly as follows:
1. Identify potential future developments (either events or
trends) whose occurrence or whose deviation from expected
values would have a significant effect on the future
operating environment of the planner's subject area.
2. Obtain forecasts (through Delphi or otherwise) regarding
these developments.
3. Estimate the cross impacts among these developments.
*4. Use cross-impact analysis to establish the relative
sensitivity of the developments to one another.
5. Estimate the influenceability of the developments, that
is, the degree to which the event probabilities or the
trend values can be influenced by deliberate intervention
on the part of the decision-maker (or decision-making
agency) on whose behalf plans are being made. In doing so,
separate the relatively uninfluenceable from the highly
influenceable developments. The former establish the
spectrum of exogenous, uncontrollable characteristics
of the future environment for which plans are being made.
The latter are the "operative" developments through the
manipulation of which the planner can hope to influence
the course of future events in a desired direction.
*For a detailed description, see the two previously
cited papers (footnotes on page 7).
-9-
6. Establish the resource constraints which prospective plans
must be designed to accommodate.
7. Using the sensitivities ascertained earlier and the
developments identified as operative, select (or invent)
alternative action programs within the stated resource
constraints that seem to be promising candidates for
attaining desired objectives.
8. Use cross-impact analysis to determine the relative
merits of these alternative action programs in terms of
expected results and their dispersion, and thus select
one or several of the most promising alternatives.
For many obvious reasons (the surrogate character of the
cross-impact analysis as a theory substitute; the possibly
inadequate selection of developments for inclusion in the
analysis; the relative unreliability of the forecasts as
well as of the cross-impact estimates, even if obtained from
experts; the possibly incomplete selection of action programs
included in the comparative analysis) the outcome of this
approach may not, in fact, be the optimal strategy. Yet the
procedure represents a selection process which, if carried
out jUdiciously and conscientiously, may yield a set of stra-
tegies from which, through a process of further analysis, a
satisfactory strategy can be distilled.
The points I have tried to make may be summarized as
follows: Forecasts, whether explicit or merely implicit, are
an essential ingredient of the planning process. In the case
of long-range planning, the planner needs two kinds of long-
range forecasts: those concerning the expected, changed opera-
ting environment; and those concerning the consequences of
contemplated policies. The ｵ ｾ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｹ of such forecast? depends
on their precision and reliability, and is further enhanced
if they are developed within an explanatory setting that
enables the planner to understand the causal relationships
that are present and to utilize these to design appropriate
strategies. Forecasts are rarely very precise, especially if
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they concern societal and/or interdisciplinary matters, but
their precision as well as their reliability can be at least
slightly enhanced if they are obtained through a systematic
solicitation of expert opinions (such as might be provided by
a Delphi survey). An explanatory setting for forecasts in
the form of a well confirmed theory is generally absent;
however, a substitute having some, though limited, utility
can be constructed through the vehicle of a cross-impact
analysis.
